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This paper presents a model of competition between an incumbent and an entrant firm in 
telecommunications. The entrant has the option to enter the market with or without having preliminary 
invested in its own infrastructure; in case of facility based entry, the entrant has also the option to 
invest in the provision of enhanced services. In case of resale based entry the entrant needs access to 
the incumbent network. Unlike the rival, the incumbent has always the option to upgrade the existing 
network to provide advanced services. We study the impact of access regulation on the type of entry 
and on firms' investments. Without regulation, we find that the incumbent sets the access charge to 
prevent resale based entry and this overstimulates rival's investment that may turn out to be socially 
inefficient. Access regulation may discourage welfare enhancing investments, thus also inducing a 
socially inefficient outcome. We extend the model to account for negotiated interconnection in case of 
facilities based entry. 
Keywords 
Telecommunications, ladder of investment, access regulation, interconnection. 




The development of competition between infrastructured operators is usually seen as the ultimate goal 
in the broadband market. Regulation of access, namely the determination of the conditions for entrant 
firms to access the network controlled by the incumbent, is often considered as the crucial element to 
achieve this goal. In this respect, many national regulatory authorities across Europe seems to have 
embraced a regulatory approach based on the so called ``ladder of investment'' theory, introduced by 
Cave and Vogelsang (2003). According to this approach, regulators should encourage access to 
wholesale markets by fixing very low access prices, particularly for the network elements that are too 
expensive for new entrants to replicate. As soon as new entrants consolidate their market positions, 
authorities should increase access prices to these network elements in order to encourage entrants to 
invest and to create gradually their own infrastructure, to move up the ladder of investment in the 
industry jargon. 
Despite this regulatory approach appears to have largely influenced the action of European 
regulators,
1 the economic literature on the relation between access regulation and firm's investments in 
telecommunications is still lagging behind.
2 The urge for a theoretical analysis providing guidance and 
suggestions on these crucial issues is also reinforced by the fact that, nowadays, new access 
technologies have made the deployment of access networks alternative to that of the incumbents' much 
more affordable (Reichl and Ruhle, 2008).
3 
Obviously, not only entrant firms may develop their infrastructures to offer next generation 
services, but also the incumbent, which is usually already in control of a physical network, has the 
option to upgrade its network to supply advanced communications services. In this paper we propose a 
theoretical model that accommodates this scenario. In particular, we model competition between an 
incumbent and an entrant firm where both operators may invest in the provision of next generation 
services before retail competition takes place. Until the alternative network has not been deployed, the 
entrant needs access to the incumbent infrastructure to operate and this justifies the intervention of a 
social maximizing regulator aimed at determining the access conditions to the incumbent's network. 
More specifically, following the aforementioned ladder of investment theory, we consider a 
scenario in which an entrant operator may decide to enter the market with or without its own access 
network (facility based entry vs service based entry); in the former case, the rival does no longer need 
access to the incumbent infrastructure to operate. On the top of that, once it has deployed its 
infrastructure, the entrant is in the position to invest in advanced broadband technologies to offer 
enhanced communications services (i.e. high speed broadband) to its customers. The incumbent 
independently of the entry decision by the rival, has always the option to invest in advanced services 
                                                      
*  We thank Carlo Cambini, Paolo Lupi, and Benno Buhler for their comments on previous versions of the paper. Paper 
presented at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Association of the Southern European Economic Theorists (ASSET) and at 
the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Societµa Italiana di Economia Pubblica (SIEP). The authors also thank the participants 
of the workshop “La nuova politica industriale e le interazioni pubblico-privato nelle imprese e nei mercati", Padua 2010 
for their useful comments. 
1  A preliminary empirical analysis of the ladder of investment is in Distaso et al. (2009) where the authors test whether 
entrants have effectively climbed the rungs of the ladder of investments in 12 European countries; they show that in the 
period 2005-07 the policies adopted by National Regulatory Authorities have been broadly consistent with this regulatory 
approach. Notably, Friederiszick et al. (2008) reach a different conclusion; by using a panel of 180 telecom firms in 25 
European countries, they show that pro-entry regulation seems to have discouraged entrants investments in fixed-line 
telecommunications. For a critical review of the ladder of investment approach see Bourreau et al. (2010). 
2  For a recent and exhaustive survey on broadband investments and regulation see Cambini and Jiang (2009). 
3  In Europe, Italy represents a good example of this technological evolution: in May 2010 the three main rivals of Telecom 
Italia, the incumbent operator, Wind, Fastweb and Vodafone have announced their intention to start building their fibre 
optic network, an infrastructure alternative to that of the incumbent. Fabio Manenti and Antonio Scialà 
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by upgrading the existing infrastructure currently under its control; this implies that in our model, 
operators investments in enhanced services have a strategic nature. 
We study the impact of access regulation on the type of entry and on the amount of firms' 
investments. By setting a low access charge, the regulator stimulates service based entry and despite 
this makes the market more competitive, it may have negative effects on the amount of investments in 
advanced services. We discuss the properties of access regulation and we show that under certain 
conditions, regulator's activity may go to the detriment of social welfare. The comparison between the 
equilibrium outcomes with and without regulation is useful to highlight these regulatory failures and to 
disentangle them from market failures. 
These analyses are made under the implicit assumption of cost based interconnection where, in 
case of facilities based entry, the incumbent and the entrant operators interconnect their infrastructures 
at marginal cost. This is only one of the possible forms of interconnection between next generation 
networks that are currently under scrutiny; the other most common interconnection scheme is bilateral 
access, where firms negotiate a common interconnection charge. In the last part of the paper we 
evaluate how equilibrium outcomes change when firms negotiate on a reciprocal term of access. 
Our model builds upon several papers that have been focussing on the relationship between access 
regulation and entry in telecommunications. Brito et al. (2010) model competition between a vertically 
integrated incumbent and a downstream entrant requiring access to the incumbent's network. The 
authors develop a model where only the incumbent is allowed to sink a fixed amount of investment in 
order to deploy a Next Generation Network
4 and compare two regulatory regimes, one with a regulator 
that can commit to an access policy towards the new network before the incumbent has made its 
investment, and one in which the regulator cannot; the authors show that when the regulator sets a 
two-part access charge, the availability of two regulatory instruments (i.e. the two parts of the non 
linear tariff) may allow the regulator to solve the usual trade-off between static efficiency (reduce 
incumbent's marker power) and dynamic efficiency (stimulate incumbent's investments). 
Another paper which is closely related to the ours is Avenali et al. (2010). The authors analyze the 
impact of access price regulation on the entrants' decision to enter where the entrant has the option to 
invest in enhanced services. Interestingly, in a two-period game, they show that an access charge that 
rises over time fosters infrastructure investment by the entrant, a regulatory behavior consistent with 
the ladder of investment theory. Brito et al. (2010) and Avenali et al. (2010) analyse the two polar 
cases where either the incumbent or the entrant invest in new infrastructures. In this paper we follow a 
more realistic scenario and we allow both the firms to invest in enhanced services; more specifically, 
we distinguish between two forms of investments: the construction of a new infrastructure and the 
investments in enhanced services. 
Foros (2004) is also particularly relevant to our analysis. In a framework where only the incumbent 
invests and where firms competing on the retail market are assumed to be heterogenous in their 
technical efficiency, the author shows that access price regulation, with no commitment by the 
regulator, may reduce welfare if the efficiency of competing firms technologies do not differ too 
much. Moreover, the incumbent firm may overinvest to foreclose the market. From Foros (2004) we 
borrow the demand structure affected by firms' investments in value added services; thanks to these 
investments, firms supply services valuable to their customers and that generate also a positive 
spillover to the whole economy; in this framework, we concentrate on the effects of the entrant 
decisions to enter on the incumbents' investments in value added service. 
                                                      
4  Notably, in another version of the model, the authors extend their framework to encompass the case of the entrant 
deploying its infrastructure; they show that if the investment cost is large, the possibility of both firms investing never 
improves social welfare BPV08. They model a framework which is rather different from ours, being investments 
decisions a discrete choice which imply a fixed cost of deployment. Furthermore, and unlike in [5], they assume that in 
case the incumbent rolls out its new network, the old infrastructure is still in place and the entrant can still gain access to 
it. Access Regulation, Entry, and Investment in Telecommunications 
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Finally, despite they do not model investments in enhanced services, our paper also relates to 
Bourreau and Dogan (2005) and Bourreau and Dogan (2006). Both these papers study the decision to 
enter of a rival operator in a dynamic context. In the former, the two authors focus on the effect of 
multi-period access pricing on the ``make or buy'' decisions of an entrant; they show that the 
incumbent tends to set too low the access price and this induces the entrant to roll out its network too 
late from a social welfare perspective. In the latter paper, the authors go even further on these issues 
but they ignore the role of regulation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we present the model assuming Bill & 
Keep interconnection in case of facilities based entry. In section 3 we extend the model allowing for 
negotiated bilateral interconnection charges and Section 4 concludes. 
2. The Model 
Telecommunications services are offered by two firms: an incumbent, denoted by I , and an entrant 
firm, denoted by E . The incumbent is not only active at the retail level, but it also controls and 
manages an upstream infrastructure, the access network, that represents an input for the entrant firm. 
E  may enter the market in two ways: with or without having preliminary built its own 
infrastructure;
5 in the latter case, E  needs access to I 's network to operate and, in case of entry, retail 
competition takes the form of ``service based'' competition. Alternatively, after having sunk a given 
amount  0 > F  of resources, E  can roll out its own infrastructure which allows the entrant to operate 
without the need to access I 's upstream network; retail competition is said to be ``facilities based" in 
this case. The two infrastructured operators are assumed to interconnect their networks free of charge. 
Before final production takes place, each infrastructured operator can undertake an investment 
) ( i x C  to upgrade its network in order to provide qualitatively superior services (e.g. high speed 
access broadband, etc), where  i x  represents the quality of the services offered by operator i. Note that 
while the incumbent is always in the position to invest in advanced communications technologies, E  
can undertake such investments only provided that it has entered the market with its own 
infrastructure. 
This way of modelling entrant's and incumbent's investments in advanced services has a natural 
interpretation when looking at the cost of rolling-out a next generation network. In fact, the cost of 
deploying a NGN for an alternative operator is largely associated to the cost of trenching and ducting; 
on top of these civil/engineering costs, the operator invests in ``quality'' by choosing the preferred 
technology of transmission (VDSL, fibre, etc). Incumbents are far better placed than alternative 
operators to invest in NGN: they rely on the availability of the vast majority of network elements 
needed to deploy a NGN (ducts, fibre, street cabinets) and they can also enjoy revenues from 
dismantling unused elements and selling their respective locations.
6 For simplicity, in our model we 
normalize to zero the incumbent fixed cost of deploying a NGN; therefore while the incumbent rolls-
out its advanced network by investing  ) ( I x C  in service quality, the entrant has to sink preliminary the 
fixed amount F  to cover ducting and trenching costs. Therefore, in this stylized framework, F  can 
be reinterpreted as the entrant's cost disadvantage with respect the incumbent in rolling out the 
alternative infrastructure. 
It deserves also to be noted that this structure of investments in enhanced services is consistent with 
the so called ``ladder of investment'' theory, a regulatory approach initially proposed by Cave and 
                                                      
5 We  model  E  as a new entrant; equivalently, E  could have been modelled as already active in the market as a pure 
reseller, with its current profits normalised to zero; according to this interpretation, E 's decision should have been about 
wether to remain a service based competitor seeking access through unbundling to the existing infrastructure or to move 
up the investment ladder by building its own network. 
6  For details about the costs of rolling out a next generation network see (Elixmann et al., 2008). Fabio Manenti and Antonio Scialà 
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Vogelsang (2003) - and then refined in Cave (2006) - that has largely influenced European regulators. 
Despite this theory has been proposed to describe unbundling and access pricing regulation in 
traditional broadband, in Cave (2010) is shown that an equivalent ladder exists with NGNs.
7 
According to this view, entrants' investments in telecommunications occur following a sequential 
process: new comers first invest in the network elements that are easier to replicate and, once gained 
market shares and knowledge, they may decide to ``climb'' the ladder of investment by replicating also 
the other parts of the network. The last step is reached when entrants build their own alternative 
network; this allows them to invest in order to offer advanced services, without the need to access the 
incumbent's network. The timing of the investments is described in Figure 1, where  {0,1} = b  
indicates  E 's entry decision: b =0 if entry occurs without infrastructure and b =1 otherwise;  I x  and 
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The pattern of the investments affects the demand's structure. In fact, by investing  ) ( i x C , the 
infrastructured operator i is able to offer value added services of quality  i x ; customers are willing to 
pay a higher price for these services and following [12], we represent this as an upward shift in the 
demand function faced by the firm. Furthermore, the investment may have a positive effect also on the 
demand schedule faced by the rival (positive spillover). This spillover may have different sources. 
Consider two firms that are competing in the market for access to the internet, where the investment in 
firm  i's physical network allows the firm to offer higher Quality of Services (QoS in the industry 
jargon); in this case, the better the quality of services on network i, the better the quality also enjoyed 
by firm  j 's customers when they download content from sites hosted on i's network. Alternatively, a 
higher i's QoS, may stimulate the provision of new and more advanced on-line services that go to the 
benefit also of firm  j 's customers. 
Formally, we model the demand functions faced by the incumbent and the entrant as follows:  
 
  , = | , = | 0 = 0 = E I I b E E I I b I q q x A P q q x A P − − + − − + μ β  (1) 
in case of service based entry (b =0); alternatively, in case of facilities based entry (b =1), both firms 
may invest in value added services and the demand functions are:  
 
  , = | , = | 1 = 1 = E I I E b E E I E I b I q q x x A P q q x x A P − − + + − − + + μ β μ β  (2) 
where  [0,1] ∈ β  represents the own demand effect of the investment in value added services, and 
] [0,β μ∈  the spillover effect. It is natural to assume that  β μ ≤ , namely that the spillover cannot be 
larger that the effect generated by own investments. 
                                                      
7  The European Regulatory Group also shares the opinion that, although more “sophisticated”, a ladder of investment still 
exists in a NGN environment; see ERG (2007) for details. Access Regulation, Entry, and Investment in Telecommunications 
5 
When the entrant decides to enter without having preliminary invested in its own infrastructure, it 
needs access to I 's network; we denote with a the access charge that E  pays to I  for each unit of 
output sold to customers. 
We are now able to define I 's and E 's profit functions. Using expressions (1), when E  enters 
without infrastructure, incumbent's and entrant's profits are respectively given by:  
  ), ( ) ( ) ( = | 0 = I E o I I o E I I b I x C q c a q c c q q x A − − + − − − − + Π β  (3) 
and  
  , ) ( = | 0 = E E E I I b E q c a q q x A − − − − + Π μ  (4) 
where  o c  represents the upstream marginal cost faced by the incumbent,  i c ,  E I i , = , the cost at the 
retail level faced by firm i and  ) ( I x C  the investment in value added services incurred by the 
incumbent. In expression (3), the term  E o q c a ) ( −  represents the access revenues enjoyed by the 
incumbent which is proportional to  E q , the entrant's output. 
Alternatively, if E  enters with its own infrastructure, using expression (2), I 's and E 's profits are 
respectively given by:  
  ), ( ) ( = | 1 = I I I o E I E I b I x C q c c q q x x A − − − − − + + Π μ β  (5) 
and  
  , ) ( ) ( = | 1 = F x C q c c q q x x A E E E o E I I E b E − − − − − − + + Π μ β  (6) 
where  F  and  ) ( E x C  represent E 's fixed cost of rolling out the alternative infrastructure and the 
amount of investments in value added services respectively. Note that whenever the entrant enters the 
market with its own facilities, it does no longer need access to I 's infrastructure and, consequently, 
the incumbent does not receive any access revenues. 
For the sake of simplicity, all through the paper we normalize to zero the marginal costs of 








x C . 
One of the crucial ingredients of our model is the determination of a, the access charge payed by E  
to  I  whenever the entry regime b =0 occurs. The access charge can be either regulated or 
unregulated. In case of access regulation, the regulator sets a at the welfare maximizing level; in 
order to rule out the possibility of access subsidization, we always assume that the regulator cannot set 
the access charge below the cost of providing access, formally  0 ≥ a . We model two regulatory 
regimes:  ) i  access regulation with commitment and  ) ii  access regulation without commitment. In the 
former case, the regulator intervenes before firms have taken their investments decisions and she finds 
a way to commit to her regulatory decision afterwards, while in the latter case the regulator, which in 
this case is assumed to be unable to commit to a long run decision, sets a only once I  and E  have 
already invested. The distinction between these two regimes is relevant since, as discussed above, the 
ladder of investment theory is essentially a regulatory regime where the regulator commits herself to 
adhere to a predetermined pattern in the access charge. 
Therefore, we model three possible scenarios concerning the determination of the access charge:  
1.   unregulated access, whereby a is set by the incumbent;  
2.  access regulation without commitment, whereby the regulator sets the socially optimal access 
charge after having observed I 's and E 's investments behavior;  
3.  access regulation with committed regulator, whereby the regulator sets the socially optimal access 
charge before firms undertake their investments.  Fabio Manenti and Antonio Scialà 
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In the paper, we will solve for the equilibrium of the game in the three regulatory regimes. We will 
proceed under the simplifying assumption  β μ = , whereby the spillover effect is identical to the own 
demand effect. This allows us to obtain manageable solutions with little loss of generality; in order to 
reassure the reader on the generality of our results, in the appendix we generalize the model to the case 
with  β μ < , and we discuss the main differences with the reference case. 
2.1 Unregulated access 
When the access charge is unregulated, the terms of access are set by the incumbent firm. We solve 
the model by backward induction; let us start from the last stage of the game, namely the competitive 
stage where I  and E  compete à la Cournot in the retail market. If E  has entered with its own 
infrastructures (b =1), the incumbent and the entrant set, respectively,  I q  and  E q  in order to 













Substituting these expressions back into the profit functions and maximising these latter with respect 














x x b E b I  (8) 
Finally, using all these expressions, firms' profits with facilities based entry are as follows:  
  . | = | ,
) 4 (9
) 2 (9
















Let us now consider the alternative case of service based entry, b =0. In this case, for any unit of 
output sold, the entrant pays the incumbent the access charge; using the profit functions given in 
expressions (3) and (4), it is possible to derive the optimal output sold by the two firms as a function 






= | 0 =
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− + + + β β
 (10) 
As expected, the quantity produced by the entrant decreases with the access charge. It is possible to 
verify that incumbent's profits are monotonically increasing with a; as a consequence, if the 
incumbent is left free to set the access charge, it will set a at the highest possible level, namely the 
level that drives the entrant out of the market. Formally, I  sets a such that  0 = | 0 = b E q . Using 








where the superscript 
ur  indicates that we are in the unregulated scenario. Going back to the first 
stage, the optimal level of enhanced investments undertaken by the incumbent when it charges 
ur a  is 










I . It is interesting to note that the industry-wide amount of investments in 
enhanced services in case of facilities based entry,  1 =
*
1 =
* | | b E b I x x + , is lower than  0 =
* |b
ur
I x ; the reason 
is evident: provided that firm  j  benefits of i's investments in enhanced services due to the spillover 
effect, they have the typical nature of a public good. The equilibrium shows underinvestment due to 
firms' opportunistic behavior. 
                                                      
8  The second order conditions are satisfied. Access Regulation, Entry, and Investment in Telecommunications 
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When the incumbent is left free to set the access charge, the entrant cannot enter without the 
deployment of its own network and the incumbent is able to replicate the level of profits that it would 













From expressions (9), it emerges immediately that E  enters and invests in its own infrastructures only 
if 












This result is well known in the economic literature.
9 The incumbent uses the access charge to deter 
service based entry; E  may, eventually, enter only after having invested in its own network: only 
facilities based entry may occur and this is possible only when the cost of the investment F  is not too 
large. 
Note that 
ur F  increases with β ; indeed, the larger β , the more value is generated by the 
investments in value added services - carried-out by both firms - and the higher the post entry profit 
for E ; hence, as β  takes larger values, E  enters also when F  is larger.
10 
It is now useful to determine the equilibrium level of welfare, W . Following standard arguments, 
we measure W  as the sum of the consumers' and producers' surpluses; formally: 
E I E I CS CS W Π + Π + + = , where  I CS  and  E CS  represent the total surplus enjoyed by I  and E  
consumers' respectively. In case of facilities based entry, these surpluses are defined as:  
  . , = ,
2
) | ) ( (
= |
1 =
1 = E I i with
q P x x A
CS
i b i E I
b i
− + + β
 
Using the equilibrium expressions  1 =
* |b i x ,  1 =
* |b i q ,  1 =
* |b I Π  and  1 =
* |b E Π , it is possible to derive the 















In case of service based entry, the general expression of the welfare function defined as the sum of 
consumers and producers surpluses is given by:  
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q q q q x A
q q
W − + − − + +
+
β  (12) 
This last expression does not depend on a; in fact, the access charge represents a mere transfer from 
the entrant to the incumbent, without any direct effect on the level of welfare; obviously, a indirectly 
impacts the quantities sold by the two firms and the amount of investments. Using the equilibrium 
outputs and the amount of investments derived above for the case  0 = b , the level of welfare 













ur  (13) 
                                                      
9  Among others, see Avenali et al. (2010). 
10 Note  0 >
ur F  for any  (0,1] ∈ β . Fabio Manenti and Antonio Scialà 
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Without access regulation, we know that at the equilibrium only infrastructured entry may occur if 
ur F F ≤ . A comparison between the welfare levels with facilities based entry and without entry given 
in expressions (11) and (13) reveals an interesting aspect of the equilibrium. Let us define 
ur F
~
 as the 
level of the entrant's fixed cost such that  0 =
* |b
ur W = 1 =
* |b W :  
 
  .
) 4 (9 ) 2(2
) 8 45 23 (16
=
~
2 2 2 2




− − + A
F
ur  (14) 
By definition, whenever 
ur F F
~
> , social welfare is higher under monopoly then with facilities based 
competition. Simple algebra is enough to check that 
ur ur F F <
~
,  [0,1] ∈ ∀β ; this implies that the 
equilibrium of the game without regulation may be socially inefficient:  
 
Proposition 1 Without access regulation, entry may be socially inefficient: 
when
ur ur F F F ≤ <
~
, entry occurs but the social welfare is higher without entry.  
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of this result, which is somehow neglected in the existing 
literature. Facilities based competition has two effects on social welfare: on the one side, competition 
increases market's efficiency through lower prices, on the other side, as we have seen above, economy-
wide investments in enhanced services are lower when E  enters the market than otherwise due to 
public good arguments, and this translates into lower social surplus. Proposition 1 shows that when the 
cost of entry is large enough,  ] ,
~
(
ur ur F F F ∈ , the positive effect on social welfare due to more 
competition is not strong enough to compensate the negative effect accruing both from the cost of 
entry and from lower investments. Facilities based competition may be socially unattractive, although 
E 's private benefit of entry may still be positive. 
The figure visually shows that the inefficiency tends to disappear as β  approaches to 1; this is due 
to the fact that the social benefit associated with the larger amount of investments in enhanced services 
due to E 's entry increases with β  at a higher rate then the increase in E 's private benefit. 
Figure 2 
 
It is interesting to note that this result goes in a direction which is opposite to Bourreau and Dogan 
(2006). These authors use an inter-temporal framework to represent the entrant's choice between Access Regulation, Entry, and Investment in Telecommunications 
9 
building an alternative network or buying access to the incumbent's infrastructure; in a framework 
without investments in enhanced services, Bourreau and Dogan (2006) find that the incumbent tends 
to charge an access price which is too low from a social perspective, hence discouraging the entrant 
from rolling out its alternative infrastructure. On the contrary, in our paper the incumbent, by charging 
a too high access price, encourages E 's facilities based entry and this turns out to generate a socially 
inefficient over-investment in enhanced services.
11 
2.2 Regulated access 
Let us now consider the model when the terms of access are decided by a welfare maximising 
regulator. As we have described above, we consider two scenarios:  ) i  the regulator sets the access 
charge a after I  and E  have taken their investment decisions (regulation without commitment) and 
) ii  a is decided before the two firms undertake their investments (regulation with commitment). 
Note that independently on the type of access regulation, when the entrant opts for facilities based 
entry, the terms of access are irrelevant; the subgame  1 = b  is the same as above and in order to solve 
for the Nash equilibrium of the game we only need to determine the payoffs when access regulation 
comes into place, that is when entry occurs without E  building its own infrastructure. 
2.2.1 Regulation without commitment 
We are in the case  0 = b ; in this scenario only the incumbent has the option to invest in enhanced 
services. Given the access charge, a, competition at the retail level occurs exactly as described in 
expressions (10). The difference with respect to the previous case is that the access charge is now 
determined by the regulator that, having observed the incumbent investment decision, sets a to 
maximize welfare. 
The welfare function for the case  0 = b  is given in expression (12); substituting the output levels 
(10) and rearranging, it is immediate to derive the social welfare in terms of the level of the 























where the superscript 
rnc  indicates that we are in the case with regulation and no commitment. The 
regulator observes  I x  and decides a; it is possible to verify that for any  0 ≥ I x , the above function is 
decreasing in a, thus implying that the regulator maximizes welfare by setting the access charge at the 
lowest possible level, namely at the level of the incumbent cost of providing access:  0 =
rnc a . This is 
natural: by setting the access charge at the cost of providing access the regulator puts the entrant and 
the incumbent on equal footing, hence promoting the most efficient level of downstream 
competition.
12 
Going backwards, the incumbent sets its optimal level of enhanced services; using the fact that the 
access charge is set at zero by the regulator, solving the maximisation of (3) with respect to  I x  yields 
the following level of investment:
13  
                                                      
11  This result is driven by the investment externality; in Appendix 2, we show that when the spillover effect due to 
investments in value added services is sufficiently small compared to the own demand effect, then lack of entry may 
occur at the equilibrium; in this case, the entrant does not enter despite facilities based entry would be socially desirable, 
a situation which more closely resembles previous results. 
12  Clearly, marginal cost pricing is socially optimal provided that I  does not incur in a fixed cost of running the network 
infrastructure; in our model, the fixed cost of infrastructure maintenance are normalized to zero. 





















































rnc  (17) 
Note that, when the access charge is regulated to maximize welfare, service based entry always 
guarantees positive profits to E . Whether E  chooses  1 = b  or  0 = b  depends on the comparison 
between the profits it gets with and without investing in its infrastructures,  1 =
* |b E Π  and  0 =
* |b
rnc
E Π  
respectively. In order to proceed, it is useful to define the threshold level of the entrant's fixed cost of 
infrastructure 
rnc F  as the level such that these two levels of profits are the same; formally, we define 
rnc F  as the entry fixed cost such that  1 =
*
0 =
* | = | b E b
rnc
E Π Π :  
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) 2 (9 ) 4 (9
) 18 4 (81 2
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The following result holds:  
 
Proposition 2 When the access charge is regulated after operators' investments take place, 
entry always occurs. When 
rnc F F ≤ , the entrant enters with its own infrastructure.  
As expected, regulation acts pro-competitively: independently on the parameters' values, when the 
access is regulated, entry always occurs at the equilibrium. When the fixed cost of rolling out the 
alternative network is not too large, the entrant invests and enters the market supplying valued added 
services. As 
ur F , also 
rnc F  increases with β . 
Basic algebra is enough to show that 
ur rnc F F < ; this leads to the observation that when the terms 
of access are regulated, facility based entry is less likely to occur than without regulation. This is a 
well known distortion of access regulation: by making the conditions for service based entry more 
favorable, regulation discourages competitors investments: they prefer to ``buy'' cheap access rather 
than to ``make'' their infrastructure. 
This distortion suggests that access regulation may turn out to be inefficient; let us investigate this 
point a bit further by looking at the possibile inefficiencies induced by the regulator. More 
specifically, access regulation may generate two forms of ``failures'':  
1.regulation may discourage facilities based entry when this form of entry is socially desirable;  
2.due to the stronger competitive pressure it induces at the retail level, regulation may discourage firm 
I  from investing in enhanced services that are valuable to the society.  
Type 1 inefficiency is particularly relevant for intermediate values of F : according to Proposition 
2, when the access is regulated, E  enters with its own facilities only if 
rnc F F ≤ , while service based 
entry occurs otherwise. Alternatively, absent regulation, E  would eventually enter with its own 
infrastructure. When the cost of building up the network is not too high, it may happen that facilities 
based entry would be socially preferable to service based entry but the former does not emerge at the 
equilibrium, thus explaining the inefficiency. Access Regulation, Entry, and Investment in Telecommunications 
11 
The second type of inefficiency shows up when the cost of the infrastructure is sufficiently large: 
when 
ur F F > ,  E  stays out of the market when access is not regulated, while it enters without 
infrastructure when access regulation is in place. In this latter case, the presence of a competitor, 
whose entry cannot be discouraged by the incumbent, may induce I  to reduce the amount of 
investments in enhanced services.
14 When β  is sufficiently large, these investments are so valuable to 
consumers that social welfare would be higher when only the incumbent firm is active in the market 
rather than when also E  operates via regulated access to the incumbent network. 
In the following proposition we present analytically these two forms of regulatory failures. Before 
stating our next result it is useful to define another threshold level of the fixed cost of networked entry, 
that we indicate with 
rnc F
~
, defined as the level of F  that equates the level of welfare under 
regulation,  0 =
* |b
rnc W , to the level of welfare with networked entry,  1 =
* |b W :  
  .
) 2 (9 ) 2 (3 ) 2 (3
) 8 216 (567 2
=
~
2 2 2 2








Proposition 3 When  } ,
~
{ < <
ur rnc rnc F F min F F , access regulation always reduces welfare 
(type 1 regulatory failure). When 
ur F F >  social welfare is higher without access regulation when 
/4 241 23 > − β  ( 0.68 ≈ ) (type 2 regulatory failure).  
Proof. See Appendix 1.  
As suggested by Proposition 3, the magnitude of the failures strictly depends on customers' evaluation 
for enhanced services; in particular, when customers attach a sufficiently large value to advanced 
services, access regulation turns out to fail independently on the level of F  (either failure of type 1, or 
of type 2, or of both types of failures). The following Corollary formalizes this observation. 
Corollary 1 Independently of the level of F , for  /4 241 23− ≥ β , regulation never 
improves social welfare.  
2.2.2 Regulation with commitment 
Let us now focus on the case with regulatory commitment. In this scenario, the regulator moves first 
and she credibly announces the regulated access charge before E  takes its entry decision. Clearly, 
with respect the previous case, nothing changes in the subgame  1 = b : if E  enters with its own 
infrastructure, the regulatory environment does not play any role and the pay-offs for this subgame are 
the same as before. 
Let us now focus on the subgame  0 = b . The Cournot stage is exactly as above; given the access 
charge, the quantities produced by I  and E  at the retail level are those given in expressions (10). 
Going backwards, the incumbent observes a and decides  I x ; plugging the Cournot outcomes into I 's 












                                                      
14  Formally, when 


























; simple algebra shows that  0 =
*
0 =






any β . Fabio Manenti and Antonio Scialà 
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where the superscript 
rc indicates that we are in a situation with access regulation and regulatory 
commitment. It is interesting to note that now a becomes an instrument in the regulators' hands that 
can be used to influence the amount of investments in next generation services; more precisely, 
0 = |b
rc
I x  increases with a, indicating that a higher access charge stimulates I 's investments in 
enhanced services: a larger a makes the service based rival less competitive, hence allowing the 
incumbent to increase its investments. Using  0 = |b
rc












which, clearly, decreases with a. It is useful to note that for sufficiently large values of a, the output 
produced by the rival is driven down to zero and the market is foreclosed; more specifically, we 
denote with  ) /(2 =
2 β − A a
rc
forec  the level of the access charge such that for 
rc
forec a a ≥ , the rival does 
not find it optimal to enter. 
By substituting  0 =
* |b I q ,  0 =
* |b E q  and  0 = |b
rc
I x  obtained in this case, back into the social welfare 
function, it is possible to derive the level of welfare as a function of a: 
 
 







32 9 18 2
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0 =
β
β β β β
−
+ − − − − − a a A A
a W b
rc  (18) 
The regulator, sets the non negative level of a that maximizes welfare; formally, the committed 
regulator faces the following problem:  
  0 = | ) ( max b
rc
a
a W  
  0. . . ≥ a t s  
















































This expression deserves some discussion. When the regulator is able to set a before firms take their 
investment decisions, the regulatory strategy is in fact more articulated than in the scenario without 
commitment. More precisely, for sufficiently large values β  ( 0.86 /2 3 ≈ ≥ β ), the regulator finds 
it optimal to set the access charge at 
rc
forec a , i.e. level that makes entry via access to I 's network no 
longer profitable. For smaller values of β , the regulated access charge decreases and the regulator 
                                                      










a , which is positive for  /8 2 3 > β  and negative 
otherwise. In this latter case, the constraint is binding and the optimal access charge is  0 =
rc a . When  /2 3 ≥ β , 
rc
forec a a ≥ ˆ  and  ) /(2 =
2 * β − A a
rc
. The second order condition for welfare maximization is satisfied. Access Regulation, Entry, and Investment in Telecommunications 
13 
makes service based entry profitable, while for β  that takes even smaller values 
( 0.53 /8 2 3 < ≈ β ), a is set at the cost of providing access as in the no commitment case. 
It is interesting to note that while without commitment optimal regulation always implies marginal 
cost access pricing, with commitment this occurs only in a restricted set of parameters values, namely 
when customers' evaluation for value added is sufficiently small. The reason for this regulatory policy 
relies on the fact that, while without commitment the regulator takes firms' investment decisions as 
given and the best she can do is to lower a as much as possible to improve market's efficiency in case 
of service based entry, with commitment the regulator is able, at least to a certain extent, to influence 
firms' investments. When β  is sufficiently large, firms' investments are particulary valuable to the 
society and entry of an infrastructured operator is socially desirable; in this case, the regulator 
stimulates facilities based entry by credibly announcing an access charge above the marginal cost of 
providing access. On the contrary, when β  is small, facilities based entry has little impact on social 
welfare and the regulator prefers to entice service based entry by setting a=0. From this discussion 
emerges how a committed regulator can use a as an instrument to stimulate the deployment of new 
infrastructures, a result which is broadly consistent with the ladder of investment theory.
16 
We are finally ready to define firms' profits and social welfare when the entrant does not invest in 
its own infrastructure; using all the above arguments, it is possible to compute the relevant levels of 
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As in the previous cases, the equilibrium of the game emerges from the comparison between the level 
of profits that E  is able to obtain with and without the investment in infrastructures. The result is 
presented in the following proposition: 
                                                      
16  Although in a different scenario, our conclusion is also reminiscent of a similar result obtained in Avenali et al. (2010). Fabio Manenti and Antonio Scialà 
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Proposition 4 When the regulator is credibly committed to regulate the access charge at 
rc a
* : if  /2 3 ≥ β  only facilities based entry occurs, provided that 
ur F F ≤ ; when  /2 3 < β  entry, 
either service or facilities based, always occurs. In this last case, the entrant enters with its own 
infrastructure if 
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 (22) 
Proof. From a comparison between the level of profit that E  gets by deploying its infrastructure, 
1 =
* |b E Π  given in (9), and the amount it gets by seeking access to the incumbent's network,  0 =
* |b
rc
E Π  
given in (20), the proposition follows immediately.  
This proposition highlights the properties of the entry game with committed regulator. As 
explained above, for sufficiently large values of β , the regulator optimally commits herself to set the 
access charge at 
rc
forec a  to prevent service based entry and to stimulate E 's investment. This means 
that when  /2 3 ≥ β , the entrant faces a situation identical to the unregulated case in which service 
based entry is not an option and facilities based entry occurs only if the fixed cost of building an 
infrastructure is non too large, namely 
ur F F ≤ . This explains the first part of Proposition 4. 
When  /2 3 < β , customers give smaller value to enhanced services and there is less need to 
stimulate investments; in such a situation, the regulator sets the access in a way to guarantee that, with 
certainty, a form of competition will emerge at the equilibrium; the type of entry actually chosen by 
E , either service or facilities based, will depend on the magnitude of F : for values equal or smaller 
than 
rc F , E  will enter with its own infrastructure, while service based entry will occur otherwise. 
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the the entry choice at the equilibrium. The same 
diagram is useful to represent the social efficiency of this form of regulation compared with the case 
without commitment; for this reason, we have drawn also the other relevant threshold levels of the 
fixed cost of networked entry, 
rnc F , 






. In the diagram we have plotted the various 
thresholds with respect to β .
17 
                                                      




If on the one side regulatory commitment tends to reduce regulatory failures, on the other it has an 
ambiguous effect on stimulating inefficient entry. With respect to regulatory failures, we know from 
the previous section that access regulation may deter socially desirable facilities based entry (type 1 
regulatory failures). When the regulator is credibly committed to charge 
rc a
* , this failures are less 
likely to occur; this can be easily verified by looking at the threshold level 
rc F  (the solid line in 
Figure 3). For  /8 2 3 > β , 
rc F  is larger than the un-committed counterpart 
rnc F : this implies that 
we may still have a regulatory failure of type 1, but it tends to occur for a smaller set of parameters' 
values. In other words, when the regulator is committed to adopt the regulatory policy 
rc a
* , this 
failure is less severe. As documented in Figure 3, this occurs when  /2) 3 /8, 2 (3 ∈ β . 
On the other side, we have shown that when  /2 3 ≥ β , 
rc a
*  is set to make service based entry not 
profitable. As discussed above, in this case E  faces a scenario that mimics perfectly the unregulated 
one and the equilibrium of the game also resembles the inefficiencies of this latter case (see 
Proposition 1); as shown in Figure 3, when  /2 3 > β , any time 
rc F F <  (that coincides with 
ur F  
for these values of β ) inefficient entry may occur. 
 
Corollary 2 Compared with the case with uncommitted regulation, the equilibrium of the 
entry game with regulatory commitment shows less regulatory failure when  /2] 3 /8, 2 (3 ∈ β  and 
larger inefficient entry when  /2 3 > β .  Fabio Manenti and Antonio Scialà 
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3. The model with bilateral access 
Consider facilities based entry; so far, we have implicitly assumed that the two firms would have 
reciprocally interconnected their networks for free, namely that I  and E  were able to exchange 
freely traffic and data. This interconnection scheme where the reciprocal termination charge is zero, is 
usually referred to as Bill and Keep (B&K). Since in our model we have also implicitly assumed zero 
marginal cost of interconnection, this scenario is also consistent with a cost based interconnection 
regime. 
Bill & Keep is one possible form of interconnection; indeed, there is currently a lively debate about 
which would be the best interconnection regime in the emerging world of the next generation 
networks Marcus07. One of the alternatives that has attracted the attention of practitioners and policy 
makers is negotiated bilateral access, an interconnection regime that has been widely applied to 
traditional telephony; with bilateral access, the two networked operators need to collaborate on the 
determination of a symmetric interconnection charge. It is interesting to evaluate how the predictions 
of the model would change when I  and E  need to preliminary agree upon the terms of 
interconnection. The assumption of reciprocal interconnection is natural in our context where, in case 
of b =1, the two infrastructured operators are identical; therefore, we assume that the amount that I  
pays to E  in order to access its network is the same that E  pays to I  for access in the opposite 
direction. We will assume that the interconnection charge  0 ≥ t ,  ) i  is linear and payments occur in 
proportion to the amount of traffic exchanged and  ) ii  is determined following a Nash bargaining 
process characterized by the two firms having the same bargaining power.
18 
According to these assumptions, firm I  pays E  the amount  I tq  for interconnection and receives 
E tq  from the rival. Formally, the profit functions of the two operators in case  1 = b  become:  
  ), ( ) ) ( ( = | 1 = , I E I I E I E I b int I x C tq tq q q q x x A − + − − − + + Π β  (23) 
and  
  , ) ( ) ) ( ( = | 1 = , F x C tq tq q q q x x A E I E E E I I E b int E − − + − − − + + Π β  (24) 
where the subscript 
int  reminds us that we are currently analyzing the model with bilateral 
interconnection. We proceed by backward induction and we start from the last stage of the game when 
the two firms compete “à la Cournot”; I  and E  set their profit maximizing quantities, that, given t, 
are  )/3. ) ( ( t x x A E I − + +β  Substituting these expressions back into I  and E  profit functions is 
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In the last but one stage, given their investments, I  and E  negotiate the reciprocal interconnection 
charge  t; negotiations take the form of a Nash-bargaining process in which the contracting parties 
have the same bargaining power. Formally, the interconnection charge is given by:  




, b int E b int I argmax t Π Π  (25) 
                                                      
18  It must be said that with fixed or two-part interconnections charges, things may change radically. These extensions of the 
basic model go beyond the scopes of the present paper; the interested reader may refer to Laffont and Tirole (2000) for a 
syntheses of the literature on interconnection regimes. See also Vogelsang (2003) for a survey of the major contributions. Access Regulation, Entry, and Investment in Telecommunications 
17 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the disagreement point of this bargaining process is that 
there is no interconnection agreement, namely the firms cannot compete and their profits go to zero.
19 









It is interesting to note that 
* t  increases both with β  and with  I x  and  E x . Once determined the 
optimal interconnection charge, one can go back to the previous stage and solve for the investments 
levels. Replacing 
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Profit maximization reveals that the amount of value added investments undertaken by the two firms 




, β β − A x x int E int I .
20 Interestingly, looking at these 
expressions, it emerges that when firms interconnect negotiating the terms of the reciprocal access,  ) i  
they are induced to invest more in enhanced services than with B&K/cost based interconnection and 
) ii  economy-wide investments are identical to those that would be incurred by an unregulated 




, | = b
ur
I int E int I x x x + . The reason for these results is simple: as it has been widely 
studied in the literature on networks interconnection, the bilateral access charge represents an 
instrument that firms use to implicitly collude (Carter and Right 1999, Laffont and Tirole 2000): firms 
anticipate at the investment stage that they will collude at the retail level through the negotiation on t 
and are induced to invest more in enhanced services in the first place. Thanks to the interconnection 
charge, firms are able to replicate the monopolistic scenario. 
Using 
*
,int I x  and 
*
,int E x , it is immediate to derive the level of profits and the welfare with 
interconnected networks:  
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Clearly, bilateral access occurs only in the sub-game characterized by E  joining the market with its 
own infrastructure, while the other scenarios remain identical to those analyzed in the previous 
sections (with or without access regulation). 
Let us focus on the unregulated scenario. As in Section 2.1, when the access charge is not 
regulated,  I  will set it in order to prevent service based entry; as before, E  enters with its own 
infrastructure only if  0 | 1 =
*
, ≥ Π b int E , that is when 
ur
int F F ≤ , where  ( )( ) ) 2 /(8 4 =
2 2 2 2 β β − − A F
ur
int . A 
simple comparison between the two threshold levels with B&K and with bilateral interconnection, 
reveals that 
ur ur
int F F > ; this condition implies that when firms negotiate the terms of interconnection, 
there is more room for facilities based entry: a firm with a cost of entry such that 
ur
int
ur F F F ≤ < , 
would have not found profitable to enter in the presence of B&K interconnection scheme while it 
enters the market if bilateral access is negotiated. In other words, bilateral access stimulates 
infrastructure competition. 
                                                      
19  In a less extreme, but formally equivalent, scenario, one can assume that absent an agreement, both firms need to 
interconnect indirectly through the internet cloud at the cost of being prevented from the provision of advanced services. 
20  Second order conditions are satisfied. Fabio Manenti and Antonio Scialà 
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This result raises a further interesting issue to investigate: in Proposition 1 we have discussed the 
conditions according to which without regulation and with B&K/cost based interconnection, 
inefficient entry occurs; it is natural to extend the analysis to the case with bilateral access. 
 
Proposition 5 Consider the unregulated scenario; when networked operators negotiate a 
common interconnection charge, more inefficient entry occurs then with B&K interconnection.  
 
Proof. The Proof is straightforward. Using the welfare expressions (28) and (13), it is possible 
to derive the threshold level for the entrant's fixed cost such that  0 =
* |b
ur W = 1 =
* |b int W : 
) ) /(4(2 =
~ 2 2 2 2 β β − A F
ur
int . This level represents the counterpart of (14) with negotiated access; 






. This fact combined with 
ur ur
int F F >  is enough to prove the 
Proposition.  
More inefficient entry translates also in lower social surplus; visual inspection of the profits enjoyed 
by the two firms and of the social welfare with and without bilateral interconnection, respectively 
given in expressions (27)-(9) and (28)-(11) reveals that when I  and E  interconnect at the bilateral 
access charge 
* t  they enjoy higher profits but the social welfare is lower. Again, this is another effect 
of  t as a collusive instrument; collusion has two effects: on the one side, firms invest more in 
enhanced services and, on the other side, they collude to limit retail competition. While the first effect 
goes to the benefit of consumers, the second one goes clearly in the opposite direction. At the 
equilibrium, the former dominates. Nonetheless, it is possible to show that for β  assuming large 
values, the welfare loss of bilateral interconnection becomes smaller. 
Finally, let us move on to the scenario with regulated access. For ease of exposition, we focus only 
to the case without commitment. In Section 3.1 we have shown under which circumstances regulation 
goes to the detriment of social welfare; indeed, Corollary 1 shows that for sufficiently large values of 
β , regulation always hurts social surplus. In the Proof of the proposition we have also shown that 
regulatory failures emerge also when β  is small (see Figure 4). 
When the two firms agree upon the interconnection charge 
* t  in case of facilities based entry, it is 
possible to show the following result: 
 
Proposition 6 Compared to the unregulated equilibrium,  /4 241 23 < − β  ( 0.68 ≈ ) is a 
sufficient condition for access regulation to not reduce welfare.  
 
Proof. See Appendix 1.  
This Proposition is interesting and shows that when firms negotiate to interconnect at 
* t  in case of 
facilities based entry, access regulation may actually improve social welfare; at least for  0.68 < β , 
there are no regulatory failures. The reason for this result is quite intuitive: as we have seen, with 
bilateral access there is the tendency towards more infrastructured entry and in case of entry, firms 
collude via t. Since access regulation makes service based entry more likely to occur, it reduces 
facilities based entry and the occurrence of collusion. Regulatory failures may still emerge when β  is 
large; as already noticed, the welfare loss due to bilateral interconnection becomes smaller and the 
social desirability of deterring facilities based entry is therefore lower. Access Regulation, Entry, and Investment in Telecommunications 
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4. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we propose a theoretical model where an incumbent and an entrant firm compete in the 
market for advanced communications services. While in the long run competition between alternative 
networks may emerge, in the short run only the incumbent controls an access network and this justifies 
the intervention of a social maximizing regulator aimed at determining the conditions to access to 
incumbent's infrastructure. 
Consistently with existing economic literature, we find that when the access charge is not 
regulated, the incumbent forecloses the entrant by fixing a sufficiently high access price; however, in 
this case there is a possibly wide range of infrastructure investment cost within which infrastructured 
entry occurs even though it is not socially optimal. 
When access charges are regulated ex-post (i.e. there is not regulatory commitment) regulatory 
failures may emerge, since service based entry occurs even when infrastructured entry would be 
optimal (and it would emerge without regulation). When access charge is regulated ex-ante we show 
that regulatory failures can be reduced. 
Finally we extend the model to encompass the case of negotiated interconnection between 
infrastructured operators. We show that inefficient infrastructured entry tends to be more severe in this 
case; on the contrary access regulation appears to be less detrimental to social welfare than in the case 
of Bill & Keep interconnection regime.  Fabio Manenti and Antonio Scialà 
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Appendix 1 
Proof of Proposition 3. Regulatory failures emerge from a comparison between the welfare level with 
and without regulation. Without regulation, the social welfare enjoyed at the equilibrium is  1 =
* |b W  for 
ur F F ≤  and  0 =
* |b
ur W  otherwise, while with access regulation the social welfare is  1 =
* |b W  for 
rnc F F ≤  and  0 =
* |b
rnc W  for larger values of F , with 
ur rnc F F < . 
Clearly, regulation is irrelevant for 
rnc F F ≤  since in this case the equilibrium level of welfare is 
the same in both cases; for 
rnc F F >  it is useful to distinguish three possible scenarios:  ) i   β β <  
(low β ),  ) ii   β β β < ≤  (intermediate values of β ) and  ) iii   β β ≥  (high values of β ), where:  
  0.73.
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Figures (4)-(6) provide a graphical representation of these scenarios. In order to prove the Proposition, 
it is useful to note that:
21  
 
1.  1 =
* |b W  decreases with F  and its value at 
rnc F F =  is larger than  0 =
* |b
rnc W  for any β ; 
furthermore,  0 =
*
1 =
* | > | b
rnc
b W W  for 
rnc F F
~
< , where:  ) i  
rnc rnc F F >
~
 for any β  and  ) ii  
ur rnc F F >
~
 for  β β > . 
 
2.  0 =
*
0 =
* | > | b
rnc
b
ur W W  for  β β > .  
From all these observations, figures (4)-(6) immediately follow and so the proposition.  
 
Proof of Proposition 6. We prove this proposition following the same lines of reasoning of the Proof 
of Proposition 3. Without regulation, the social welfare enjoyed at the equilibrium is  1 =
* |b int W , defined 
in expression (28), for 
ur
int F F ≤  and  0 =
* |b
ur
int W , defined in expression (13), otherwise; with access 
regulation the social welfare is  1 =
* |b int W  for 
rnc
int F F ≤  and  0 =
* |b
rnc W , defined in expression (17), for 
larger values of F , where  2 2 2 2
2 4 6 2
) 2 (9 ) 8(2
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int F F ≤ ,  E  chooses b =1 both with and without regulation, which is, in fact, 
ineffective. For larger values of F ,  1 =
* |b int W  decreases with F  while  0 =
* |b
rnc W  is independent from 
F ; standard math is enough to prove that for  /4 241 23 < − β :  ) i   1 =
*
0 =
* | > | b int b
rnc W W  when 
ur
int F F < , and  ) ii   0 =
*
0 =
* | > | b
ur
int b
rnc W W  when 
ur
int F F ≥ . This is enough to prove the proposition.  
Appendix 2: The model with partial spillover 
In the paper we have analyzed the model with complete spillover; one may wonder wether our results 
still hold when, as it is more generally the case, the spillover effect is not complete, formally when 
β μ < . As it will become clear below, the equilibrium of the entry game may differ between the two 
scenarios, although these differences are qualitatively relevant only when β  and μ  differ 
significantly. As expected, when μ  and β  are not too much diverse, the two scenarios deliver 
consistent results. 
Let us start with the unregulated case; absent access regulation, market equilibrium may still be 
inefficient from the social perspective. To understand this, let we define as  ) i  
ur
ps F  the entrant's 
threshold level of the fixed cost of rolling out the network such that for 
ur




 the threshold level such that  0 =
* |b
ur
ps W = 1 =
* |b ps W .
22 The main difference between complete and 
partial spillover is that a different form of inefficiency may emerge for some parameters' values; in 
particular, it is possible to prove the following result:
23 
 
Proposition A1. If access charge is not regulated, there exist a subset M  of pairs  ) , ( β μ  






ps F F F ∈  entry does not occur but the social welfare would be 
higher with entry (lack of entry).  
We have drawn Figure 7 in order to provide a better understanding of this proposition. In a  ) ( β μX  






= . The parabola drawn 













<  (i.e. lack of entry). The 
subset  M  is visually represented by all the points where lack of entry occurs at the unregulated 
equilibrium. 
From the figure, it emerges that for β  not too large, Proposition 1 (excess of entry) is still valid 
also in this partial spillover environment; independently of the degree of the spillover, for β  
approximately lower that 0.74, inefficient entry is the unique outcome. This is not surprising: when β  
is not too large, and consequently μ  is not too large as well, the social value generated by the 
investments is lower than the private benefit enjoyed by the firms. This is true for both firms, but for 
E  in particular: if F  is not too large, E  enters despite its choice is not socially desirable. 
                                                      
22 The  subscript 
ps
 indicates that we are in the partial spillover case. 
23  The Proof of the results presented in this Appendix are available at the URL 
www.decon.unipd.it/ personale/ curri/ manenti/ academic/ papers/ LOI_ appendix2.pdf. Fabio Manenti and Antonio Scialà 
24 
Figure 7: inefficient entry with partial spillover 
 
Things may change when the own demand effect is large; in this case, if the spillover is also 
sufficiently large, but not too much, the equilibrium may show lack of entry. More precisely, let us 
assume that  0.74 > β ; three situations may appear:  ) i   μ  is small and the equilibrium shows 
inefficient entry,  ) ii   μ  takes larger values and the equilibrium generates lack of entry and  ) iii   μ  
close to β  with the model back again to inefficient entry. 
All these cases, are characterized by β  large, i.e. firms investments in enhanced services are 
highly valuable to firms' customers. Consider  ) i ; when the spillover is low, eventually  0 = μ , each 
firm is able to enjoy full benefit of its efforts; this overstimulates firms' investments. In particular, E 's 
incentive to enter and to invest in enhanced services is stronger than the social benefit, which is 
smaller due to the low level of the spillover, and this explains the inefficiency. Case  ) ii  is 
characterized by a larger spillover; firms investments have less the nature of private goods and, due to 
the large μ , they are socially desirable; in this case, firm i's private benefit of its investment is lower 
compared to the social value it generates and this explains why in this case E  may decide not to enter 
despite its entry would be socially desirable. 
Finally, in case  ) iii  the spillover becomes very strong; this case perfectly mimics the scenario 
analyzed in section 2.1. Firms' investments become a public good and, following standard arguments, 
underinvestment occurs at the equilibrium: as we have already discussed above, E 's entry becomes 
undesirable simply because, due to the large spillover, economy-wide investments become lower than 
under monopoly. 
Let us move on to study the model with access regulation. The main difference between the 
complete and the partial spillover case is that for extremely incomplete spillover, access regulation 
does not necessarily entice entry. More precisely, when the regulator does not commit to an access 
charge schedule before operators' investment decisions have been taken, it is possible to prove the 
following: Access Regulation, Entry, and Investment in Telecommunications 
25 
Proposition A2. Suppose the access charge is regulated after operators' investments take 
place; in this case when  /2 3 > β  and  )/2 6 (3 <




* ≤ . 
This Proposition shows that when the direct value generated by firms investments is sufficiently strong 
and the spillover is sufficiently low, the entrant may find it optimal not to enter the market at all. In 
particular, for strongly asymmetric spillover ( /2 3 > β  and  )/2 6 (3 <
2 + − β β μ ), access 
regulation is completely ineffective: the incumbent uses its investment in enhanced services to prevent 
service based entry
24 and the equilibrium of the entry game in this case perfectly resembles the 
unregulated scenario with E  that enters with its own network only if the fixed cost of rolling out the 
infrastructure is small enough. 
We are left with the case of committed regulation. Again, the equilibrium of the game is 
qualitatively identical to the case with complete spillover. Obviously, the optimal access charge and 
the decision to enter are quantitatively different since they also depend on μ .
25 
                                                      
24  This result is reminiscent of similar arguments obtained in Foros (2004) in a framework without facilities based entry. 
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